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The Caribbean island of Saba is a rather insignificant 
and at times invisible dot on the map, seemingly 
marginal to political modernity.1 Its five square miles is 
home to about 1.500 permanent residents. On this 
little rock in the Caribbean Sea, people subtly rewrite 
the script of postcolonial resistance.2 Until 2010, Saba 
was a constituent part of the semi-autonomous Nether-
lands Antilles. This constellation of five was dissolved 
in answer to a series of referenda. Sint Maarten and 
Curaçao attained the status of autonomous countries 
within the Dutch kingdom and the three smaller 
islands – Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba – were inte-
grated into the Netherlands as openbare lichamen or 
‘public entities’, administrative units that are sometimes 
described as ‘special municipalities’.3 This means that, 
formally, Saba now is under direct Dutch-metropolitan 
control. Saba’s new place in the Kingdom of the 
Nether lands acquires meaning and is actively reshaped 
through storytelling in ways that go unrecognized in 
Dutch Caribbean studies.
Dominant scholarship presents the continued link 
with a metropolitan power as a constraint to national 
identities and political autonomy of Caribbean popula-
tions (see, for example, De Jong 2009; Oostindie 2009). 
It is considered peculiar that these islands opt for a 
closer governmental relationship to the Netherlands 
instead of taking steps towards ‘true’ national emanci-
pation. The unprecedented integration of Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and Saba into the government system of the 
Netherlands is therefore referred to as a paradoxical 
reversal of normative decolonization (Oostindie and 
Klinkers 2001: 13-14). According to scholarly publica-
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tions, this situation inevitably leads to conflicts over 
autonomy as increased administrative supervision is 
locally experienced as ‘recolonization’ (Oostindie and 
Klinkers 2001, 2003, 2012).
I challenge these conventional wisdoms in Dutch 
Caribbean studies by listening more closely to the 
stories that people on Saba themselves tell about their 
non-sovereign political status. It is true that Sabans do 
not passively accept the way state power is now differ-
ently exercised. Their attitude of resistance is, however, 
difficult to capture in the vocabulary of Eurocentric 
social science. In their stories about Holland and its 
agents, Sabans do not describe themselves as victims 
nor do they invoke anticolonial rhetoric. Rather, they 
boast of their ability to outdo the Dutch in matters of 
governance while calling for a more actively and genu-
inely engaged metropolitan state. Averting direct 
transatlantic conflicts over local autonomy, Sabans tell 
stories in a subtler attempt to educate civil servants 
from overseas about local priorities and moralities of 
governance. In this article, then, I analyse Saban ways 
of talking about Dutch state agents and how these 
relate to scholarly work on non-sovereignty in the 
Dutch Caribbean. In particular, I argue that these 
stories suggest a different view on metropolitan state 
power and postcolonial agency than is common in the 
dominant literature.
This article is based on seven months of ethno-
graphic fieldwork conducted in 2015. This fieldwork 
mainly involved participant observation at Saba’s 
harbour and at town hall meetings, island council 
meetings and central committee meetings. In addition, 
I interviewed civil servants, politicians, business owners 
and seamen on the way they exercise or relate to state 
power within this non-sovereign context. It was mainly 
due to stories about metropolitan-Dutch state agents 
that people shared with me that I started to question 
the dominant discourse on non-sovereignty in the 
literature. The article zooms in on three stories in 
particular, which all feature Dutch state agents (such as 
civil servants, politicians or engineers). A note on this 
ethnographic material: I have chosen to incorporate 
fairly long quotations from interviews and conversa-
tions. This is partly in the spirit of the theme ‘Stories’ 
and partly to fill a gap in Dutch Caribbean studies, 
which has traditionally offered little space for the 
people of these islands to tell their tales in their own 
words.4
In the following, I first introduce the scholarly 
debate on non-sovereignty that informs this study. I 
then briefly describe the historical context in which 
Saba became a ‘public entity’ of the Netherlands, which 
is followed by a discussion of the ethnographic material. 
The first story I discuss is akin to a founding myth and 
tells the tale of how Sabans built their own road. The 
second is a re-telling of a Dutch folkloric legend by a 
Saban administrator. The last is more of a version of 
events, rather than a story. In it, a harbour master 
reflects on the spectacular event of a plane crash and 
the conflict that arose between him and a Dutch-
metropolitan police officer. In the discussion of these 
latter two stories, I focus particularly on the way in 
which the speakers alternate between English – their 
native tongue – and Dutch. By analysing these stories, 
I show how Sabans attempt to shape their non-sover-
eign present and future (Scott 2004). Most importantly, 
I show how the stories they tell about their relationship 
to the metropolitan state present those willing to listen 
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with alternative notions of state power and postcolonial 
resistance.
After anticolonialism, what’s next?
The traditional narrative of decolonization tells us how 
nations ride triumphantly and progressively towards 
emancipation (Scott 2004: 13). In defiance of this 
Romantic notion of postcolonial history, societies 
worldwide continue to express the wish to remain non-
sovereign. To be clear, the concept of non-sovereignty 
as I use it in this article refers to the political status of 
those postcolonial societies that continue to opt for 
juridical integration with their metropolitan centres 
rather than political independence (Bonilla 2013: 
209).5 This political reality is especially evident in the 
Caribbean, where the political landscape is made up of 
a plethora of governmental arrangements with the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and the 
United States. To complicate the matter even further, 
some scholars have argued that the majority of Carib-
bean societies are de facto non-sovereign, since even 
those that have achieved a formal sovereign status 
struggle to assert self-determination over their political 
and economic development (Lewis 2013; Bonilla 
2015a; Pugh 2017).
The postcolonial present is thus ‘a present after the 
collapse of the social and political hopes that went into 
the anticolonial imagining and postcolonial making of 
national sovereignties’, as David Scott (2004: 1) grace-
fully phrases it. Despite this widespread disappoint-
ment with unfulfilled promises of political and 
economic modernity (Bonilla 2015a: xiv), dreams of 
nation and state and desires for statehood and self-
determination have not disappeared. The general 
question that drives this article is how the people that 
live in these non-sovereign societies shape and talk 
about the politics and structures of entanglement that 
characterize the current postcolonial moment. In 
particular, I explore the ways in which the non-sover-
eign entanglement of Saba with the metropolitan 
Dutch state manifests locally and what kind of stories 
this generates.
There is a long tradition in Dutch Caribbeanist 
literature that offers explanations for non-sovereignty 
in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although recent 
political developments have given new incentive to 
these explorations, the scholarly paradigm remains 
strikingly consistent. There seems to be widespread 
agreement that the choice of Dutch Caribbean socie-
ties to remain non-sovereign is a pragmatic one. Most 
scholarly works assert that non-sovereign societies 
maintain a political link to the metropole because it 
provides them with material benefits, such as financial 
support and economic protection (also referred to as 
‘aid addiction’) and a metropolitan passport. According 
to this discourse, the material advantages of non-
sovereignty outweigh the disadvantages, which are of 
an ideological, emotional or cultural nature. The 
assumption here is that non-sovereignty is in direct 
opposition to insular nationalisms and/or cultural 
identities. The dominant narrative is thus one of stra-
tegic instrumentalism. This line of thinking about non-
sovereignty leads scholars to conclude that the current 
governmental status of islands such as Saba is the result 
of a ‘painful trade-off between head and heart’ 
(Veenendaal and Oostindie 2018: 41). ‘For all kinds of 
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pragmatic reasons’, Veenendaal and Oostindie further 
propose, ‘the people of the Dutch Caribbean islands 
have a strong preference for a continuation of the 
present non-sovereign constitutional relations, even if 
they are well aware that the (European) Netherlands 
ultimately decides about their fate – at least, as long as 
they do not opt for full independence’ (ibid.).
Of critical concern, too, is the idiom of ‘good govern-
ance’. The literature strongly associates the govern-
ments of the Dutch Caribbean islands with corruption, 
nepotism and political clientelism (Oostindie 2009; 
Oostindie and Klinkers 2012; Roitman and Veenendaal 
2016; Scheepmaker 2009), and scholars assert that 
these non-sovereign islands are plagued by morally 
wrong political practices and governmental incompe-
tency. Since the 1990s, the involvement of the Dutch 
government in island affairs has been characterised by 
the promotion of an agenda of ‘good governance’ and, 
in response, this concept has come to play a central role 
in Dutch Caribbean studies (Hoefte 1996; Oostindie 
and Klinkers 2003). Scholars observe that this political 
agenda has led to resistance by local administrators 
who feel that their autonomy is undermined (Hoefte 
1996: 42) and who seek options to keep matters under 
their own control (Oostindie and Klinkers 2012). 
Deugdelijk bestuur or ‘good governance’ in this discourse 
refers to administrative and financial norms set and 
controlled by the metropolitan centre. Scholarly works 
present the metropolitan-Dutch government as the 
guardian of ‘good governance’ in the kingdom and, 
however implicit, as exemplifying such ‘good’ qualities 
of efficiency, transparency and professionalism. It is 
striking that even those scholars that are mild in their 
judgment of the island governments (see, for example, 
Hoefte 1996; De Jong 2009) do reproduce this moral 
geography of governance.
To summarize, scholars typically write about the 
Dutch Caribbean islands as entities that are willingly 
trapped in unfortunate state structures: they trade in 
true national emancipation for economic guarantees of 
metropolitan protection. In this discourse, metropolitan 
state power is considered to be materially beneficial 
and a force of good, however problematic in the face of 
the ‘distinct cultures’ of the islands. Resistance against 
its manifestation on the islands takes the form of 
national and cultural ‘identity issues’ (Oostindie 2009: 
135) and is expressed in anticolonial, nationalist 
rhetoric. Resistance, moreover, is said to be directed at 
carving out spaces of governmental autonomy. Seem-
ingly, the main objective of these non-sovereign popu-
lations is to profit economically from the metropole 
whilst keeping the Dutch at bay.
Although the Dutch Caribbeanist paradigm has 
been criticized for its ethnonationalist perspective on 
ideas of belonging and for the assumption of instru-
mentalism (Van der Pijl and Guadeloupe 2015), a 
sustained critique based on empirical research so far 
does not exist. Also, ethnographies of the state are still 
a rarity in Caribbean studies ( Jaffe 2014; Pugh 2017). 
The narratives offered below directly challenge the 
discourse in the literature. I hope to highlight the ways 
in which Sabans, through storytelling, subvert and 
actively reconfigure the moral geography of governance 
in the kingdom. Before moving on to the ethnographic 
material, however, I first wish to outline the history of 
Saba’s governmental relationship to the Netherlands – 
a history that in many ways sets the stage for the stories 
that form the basis of this article.
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A history of hardship and hope
In the days of colonialism, Saba was of little economic 
worth to the Netherlands. The island was claimed in 
the geopolitical wargames of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, when political struggles in Europe 
were fought out in the Caribbean (Espersen 2017; 
Guadeloupe 2009a: 20-21). Its geopolitical value may 
have been of some significance at some point, but this 
steep and inhospitable rock did not offer much in a 
capitalist sense. Despite early efforts to establish a 
plantation colony, the economy of Saba has mostly 
been one of small scale subsistence and modest regional 
trade, which did, however, rely on the labour of enslaved 
Africans (Espersen 2017). Nowadays, the descendants 
of those enslaved Africans still make up about half of 
the population. Other residents are of Irish, Scottish, 
English and Dutch descent, and newcomers who hail 
from the Caribbean region, the United States, Europe 
and Asia (Guadeloupe 2009b).
In 1954, the Statuut or Charter signalled the formal 
end of the colonial era in the Dutch Caribbean. The 
Charter established that the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands would henceforth exist of three equal partners: 
the Netherlands, Suriname and the Netherlands 
Antilles. The expectation was that, in the near future, 
full independence would be transferred to the Nether-
lands Antilles as a whole, following Suriname which 
achieved formal independence in 1975 (Oostindie and 
Klinkers 2001). Aruba fractured this dream in 1986 
when it was granted a status aparte as autonomous 
country. This was mostly in answer to Aruban resent-
ment over Curaçao’s dominance of the central Antil-
lean government (Hoefte 1996). In the meantime, Saba 
continued its existence at the outer margins of the 
Dutch kingdom. The politicians and lawmakers of the 
Netherlands Antilles were largely indifferent to Saba 
and generally perceived it as a costly burden to the 
other, economically more prosperous islands (De Jong 
2009: 15; Guadeloupe 2009b: 59).
It is in the light of this enduring position of postco-
lonial marginality that I refer to the diverse group of 
residents of Saba as ‘Sabans’. Although there is not, nor 
has there recently been, a strong independence 
movement on Saba, its historical experience is charac-
terised by insular autonomy. In an interview, a local 
merchant reflected on the way that island life has been 
influenced by external indifference. She said: ‘Most of 
the time we’re here on this island by ourselves. We have 
to fend for ourselves basically. We don’t have extra help’. 
This attitude affects and informs the lives of everyone 
who calls Saba their home, regardless of passport, 
political affiliation, skin colour, or even financial means. 
The outside world does not seem to care about Sabans, 
even in times when they live lives of poverty, hardship 
and chronic fragility.
Hoping to improve their predicament, Saban 
administrators sought a closer relationship to the 
Netherlands when the Netherlands Antilles showed 
signs of further disintegration in the early 2000s. After 
a political campaign, an overwhelming majority of 86 
percent of Saban-Dutch citizens voted for integration 
into the Dutch state system in a referendum in 2004. 
The new political status of ‘special municipality’ for 
Saba, Bonaire and Sint Eustatius came into effect on 
October 10, 2010. Dutch citizens on this side of the 
Atlantic therefore commonly refer to the governmental 
reorganisation and its aftermath as ‘10-10-10’. The 
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Netherlands has since then governed the islands as a 
single entity that variably goes under the name of the 
BES (short for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba) or the 
‘Caribbean Netherlands’. The Rijksdienst Caribisch 
Nederland (RCN; Central Government Caribbean 
Netherlands) is the name of the metropolitan bureau-
cracy for the three islands. It oversees the execution of 
Dutch policies and governmental tasks, such as, 
amongst other things, law enforcement, customs, 
education, labour affairs and social welfare. The RCN 
has a few small offices and departments on Saba and 
Sint Eustatius, while its centre is located on Bonaire, 
separated from Saba and Sint Eustatius by roughly 900 
kilometres of sea. A number of governmental responsi-
bilities still reside with the island government, such as 
public works, regulation of the harbour and airport, and 
agriculture. It should be noted, however, that the budget 
for running the island government is set and strictly 
supervised by the metropolitan government. Money 
for local initiatives in policymaking is project-based 
and is acquired by appealing to separate and ‘special’ 
funds.
There is widespread disillusionment about the way 
things have turned out after ‘the Dutch took over’. 
Residents complain about ‘all these rules, rules, rules 
from Holland’, are annoyed by the dominance of 
Bonaire in matters of governance and have come to be 
convinced that the ‘taxman is out to kill us’. Contrary 
to general discourse in scholarly publications (see, for 
example, Veenendaal 2015; Veenendaal and Oostindie 
2018), however, I never heard anyone on Saba describe 
these developments as ‘recolonization’. At the begin-
ning of fieldwork in August 2015, almost exactly five 
years after the constitutional change, I was initially 
surprised that people did not express their disappoint-
ment in stronger, anticolonial rhetoric. By listening to 
their complaints and anecdotes, it slowly became clear 
to me that the way in which people on Saba relate to 
the metropolitan state follows a different storyline than 
the scholarly one I was familiar with. The stories I offer 
below speak of more subtle and ambiguous forms of 
resistance and power. I will interpret and provide 
context for each of these stories individually, after 
which I will offer a more general analysis of the way 
Sabans talk about their non-sovereign status.
The road that couldn’t be built
Saba’s four small villages have poetic names – The 
Bottom, St. John’s, Windwardside and Zion’s Hill 
(more commonly known as Hell’s Gate) – but its only 
road is simply called ‘the road’. This concrete roller-
coaster winds its way through the settlements along 
steep cliffs and spectacular panoramas. The road is the 
subject of many a local legend. The island government 
has installed a monument to honour the man who 
designed it. Young Sabans shoot videos whilst driving 
their motorbike – zigzagging up through Hell’s Gate, 
down to The Bottom – and upload them for the world 
to see on YouTube. Many Sabans love to talk about 
their road to whoever cares to listen.
The general story goes something like this. In the 
1940s, most of the rest of the world had entered the 
motorized era, yet transportation on Saba still happened 
on foot, using stairs and donkey paths. This Sabans had 
done so for centuries, but some of their seamen had 
travelled abroad and returned back home with dreams 
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of progress and development. They wanted cars, thus 
they needed an actual road. Sabans appealed for help to 
the Netherlands, which sent two engineers to examine 
the possibilities. After an in-depth investigation, these 
experts concluded that Saba’s cliffs were too steep and 
its geography too extreme: the road couldn’t be built. In 
response, a Saban native by the name of Josephus 
Lambert Hassell (also known as Lambee) took matters 
in his own hands. He subscribed to a civil engineering 
study through mail correspondence, made his own 
calculations and eventually planned the road. Fellow 
Sabans then set out to build it themselves by hand. 
Together they proved, through perseverance and hard 
work, that the impossible could be done.
Those who tell this story often adapt little details, 
but their message is remarkably consistent. Listen to 
Maggie, for instance.6 Maggie is a businesswoman and 
a member of the local Chamber of Commerce. As such, 
she participated in some of the negotiations that 
preceded and followed ‘10-10-10’. She introduced her 
criticism of the recent Dutch investments in the islands’ 
infrastructure with her story of the road:
The Saba road, the road that couldn’t be built, you 
hear about that? And it was Saba people that 
finished it, because when the Dutch engineers came 
in and they had reached to the guts in Hell’s Gate 
– that area where it’s just cliffs – they were like: ‘No, 
you need to stop here, you’ll never be able to make it 
to Hell’s Gate’. After the guy said that, they [the 
workers] were like: ‘No, we gotta get home’. Because 
most of the people that were building the road was 
[sic] from Hell’s Gate. They said: ‘We’ve come all 
this way, we’ve built all these roads, it’s impossible 
for us to stop here and not get home’. And so it was. 
And it was just by hand. They had no big machinery, 
no trucks, not anything like that. Everything, the 
rocks was [sic] on their heads, the cement. Every-
thing was by hand.
For those who are unfamiliar with Saba’s geography: 
Hell’s Gate is the village that is furthest away from 
Ladder Bay, which for centuries was the only way to 
enter and leave the island. The road would drastically 
minimize the time and effort required to move goods 
and people to and fro Hell’s Gate. In their narration of 
the history of the road, Sabans therefore often assert 
that the residents of Hell’s Gate worked the hardest on 
its construction. Others, such as Maggie, imagine that 
the people from Hell’s Gate were the ones who took on 
the challenge that the Dutch engineers could or would 
not face.
All variations aside, two themes can be counted on 
to surface each time someone tells the story of the road. 
The first is an emphasis on hard, manual labour; it was 
Saban bodies that cut out hills and moved rocks. The 
second is the failure of highly educated Dutch experts 
to do what Sabans managed to accomplish with modest 
means and limited knowledge.
Maggie started our conversation by sharing this 
story and thus set the stage for the rest of it. She went 
on with a lengthy list of complaints about some of the 
infrastructural projects that have been funded by the 
Dutch government since ‘10-10-10’. Most of the public 
bids for these projects have been won by construction 
companies that are based in the Netherlands, and much 
less so by locally owned and operated businesses.7 Local 
entrepreneurs are obviously disgruntled about this situ-
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ation. The way they express their critique, however, is 
striking and is inspired by the story of the road. Rather 
than speaking of injustice, they tend to complain about 
the projects’ improper execution and ridicule the fact 
that so many of these ‘supposed experts’ or ‘doctoran-
duses’ deliver bad constructions. This is what Maggie 
had to say about the new social housing project in The 
Bottom:
When they built it, they built it with a septic tank. 
Might be used in the US, or even Sint Maarten. You 
have to pomp it out with a specialized truck, you 
have to carry it to the waste treatment plant and 
process it. On Saba, we don’t have a waste treatment 
plant, we don’t have specialized trucks. So, as soon as 
they finished it and the people moved in, they 
figured out what was happening. The tanks was [sic] 
filling up and there was nowhere to put it. It was 
creating a very bad environment over there.
To many of my research participants, this situation was 
as much tragic and frustrating as it was bitterly amusing. 
Any resident of Saba, they would say, can tell you that 
toilet waste on Saba does not go into septic tanks (with 
a closed bottom), but ends up in cesspits (with open 
bottoms, so that waste is slowly absorbed by the soil). 
During my fieldwork, this faulty construction was so 
well-known across the island that many Sabans 
indulged in jokes and complaints about improper 
sewage systems and rising costs of repairs. They would 
brag: ‘We can do it better’ – and, especially, cheaper.
These stories and anecdotes are noteworthy, since 
the infrastructural programs rolled out over the islands 
by the Dutch government function as key symbols of 
metropolitan benevolence in dominant public and 
political discourse. For example, visiting officials from 
the Netherlands hint at this image of the state as a 
benevolent provider by producing a remarkable mantra: 
‘The Netherlands spends 300 million dollars per year 
on these islands, and we only collect a 100 million in 
taxes’. Rather than serving a purely developmental 
purpose, the renovations of harbours, airports, roads 
and school buildings thus also allow some people to 
conjure up the powerful story of Dutch goodwill and 
local dependency (cf. Bonilla 2015b: 159). Ironically, 
Sabans target exactly these projects to contest not the 
legitimacy, but the competence of the metropolitan 
state. Sabans can actually be heard repeating the 
300-million-dollar-mantra but will question the need 
or proper execution of those investments in the same 
breath. Many people on Saba perceive the Dutch state 
as an extremely wasteful organisation and rightly point 
out that much of the funds for local development flow 
back to Dutch-metropolitan corporations (ibid.). In 
these stories of infrastructure, Sabans assert that, 
although they may not possess the advanced education 
and technology of Dutch-metropolitan engineers, they 
certainly know better ways to build and work with their 
island. By constantly telling themselves and others ‘we 
can do it better’, they cleverly subvert the dominant 
discourse of Dutch benevolence.
A little boy put his thumb in the dike
Besides generating an unprecedented flow of money, 
the new constitutional order in the kingdom has also 
intensified contact between the metropolitan-Dutch 
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government and its local counterpart on Saba. The 
Netherlands has recruited several hundred civil  servants 
from the Dutch public service corps to raise the quality 
of state services on the islands. They are part of the 
metropolitan mission to promote ‘good governance’ on 
the islands. Local administrators now also communi-
cate directly with the ministries in The Hague and visit 
the Netherlands much more often than before. This 
means that people – politicians and civil servants – with 
different styles and moralities of governance regularly 
encounter one another.
I explore this issue through a story that was shared 
with me by Harold. Harold is a high official in the local 
island government. He was born and raised on Saba 
and returned to his homeland after obtaining a univer-
sity degree in the United States. He is part of a family 
that has been active in the local government for decades. 
I interviewed Harold about his experiences with trans-
atlantic bureaucracy and his working relationship with 
representatives of the Dutch government. At one point 
in our conversation, he asked me:
You have never been to Madurodam?8 Go to Madu-
rodam. I think on the left side where you go to enter 
Madurodam you have the little boy with his thumb 
in the dike. You know that story?
I told him I did, but for those readers who do not: 
Harold here refers to a legend in Dutch folklore. It is 
about a young boy who discovers that the dike near his 
village is leaking. To stop the leakage, he puts his finger 
in the dike and stays there all night until he is discov-
ered. This way, the boy saves the country from a flood. 
Harold continued with a re-telling of this legend:
Okay. There was a problem, a solution was found. 
So I tell a lot of these people who come here to tell 
us and teach us better, that they know better: ‘If that 
same situation would happen now, first you will 
have to have maybe five or six consultants to study 
the problem. You’d have ten reports. You’d have 
Europese aanbestedingsregels [European procurement 
rules]. You would have the Verdrag [treaty] of 
Genève or the Verdrag van whatever. Then you’d 
have the bureaucratic thing. And then you would 
have to have a consultation. And then it would be: 
but wait a minute, the water is over the dike now. 
What do we do now? The whole of the Netherlands 
would be under water’. So not to be rude or sarcastic, 
but this is how the Netherlands has progressed.
The original story of the boy who put his finger in the 
dike speaks of the legendary ability of the Dutch to 
tame the threat of water. This, of course, is a source of 
national pride in the Netherlands, of which Harold is 
acutely aware. Harold turns this legend into a bureau-
cratic drama. To readers who hail from the North 
Atlantic, this story might raise the well-known theme 
of bureaucratic inertia. In that sense, there is nothing 
remarkable or unfamiliar about this passage.
When we place this story into its historical and 
political coordinates, however, its relevance becomes 
clear. Since the 1990s, the Dutch political agenda of 
‘good governance’ has been a way to exercise increasing 
degrees of control over the island governments (Oost-
indie and Klinkers 2012; Scheepmakers 2009). The 
technocratic interventions that are part of this agenda 
promote order, rationality, efficiency, fiscal correctness 
and transparency. These measures aim to transform the 
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island governments into a neutral force of regulation. 
In Dutch Caribbeanist literature, local, ‘informal’ ways 
of practicing politics and bureaucracy are often framed 
as a threat to strong, transparent and democratic state 
institutions (Roitman and Veenendaal 2016; Scheep-
maker 2009; Veenendaal 2016). ‘Good governance’ is 
thus explicitly presented as a way to modernise local 
governance and implicitly presents the island govern-
ments as exhibiting backward characteristics; hence 
Harold’s sneer at the end of his story.
Such bureaucratic prescriptions do not transport 
unchallenged and unchanged to the context of Saba.9 
Here, I am mostly interested in the way Harold verbal-
ises his resistance to metropolitan ideas of ‘good 
governance’. Harold explains that he tells the bureau-
cratic story of the dike to Dutch civil servants (‘these 
people who come here to tell us and teach us better’). 
He lists all the bureaucratic actions that protocol 
nowadays dictates to administer a minor and manage-
able situation. He essentially says: that little hole in the 
dike, that is Saba. He questions the need for conducting 
so many surveys, for following complex regulations, 
and for staging consultations when governing an island 
so small. The form of governance that Harold experi-
ences from The Hague does not exemplify efficiency 
and, he tells us, is inappropriate. In fact, he argues that 
many of the interventions that are necessary for ‘good 
governance’ produce situations that become unman-
ageable. Harold suggests that ‘these people’ do not 
know better at all and promotes a more common-sense 
approach: ‘There was a problem, a solution was found’.
In the literature, this kind of resistance-talk is gener-
ally interpreted as a call for a retreat of the Dutch state 
(Oostindie and Klinkers 2001; Oostindie and Klinkers 
2012). I interpret Harold’s words instead as an expres-
sion of a desire for a metropolitan state that is pro-
active and involved in local affairs. Harold does not 
categorically reject the metropolitan government or its 
agents; they simply need to adapt to the local context. 
When I asked him how he further communicates this 
message in transatlantic conversations, he said:
[A]t times when they [Dutch civil servants] try to 
come up with nonsense, I use a spreekwoord like 
praatjes vullen geen gaatjes [talking about something 
does not get it done]. They like that one. It’s like: 
hou op met die onzin [stop all this nonsense], van al 
die pôh wôh wôh wôh [all this pôh wôh wôh wôh, in 
a pompous voice]. Let’s just try and get to work.
In this quote, Harold’s impatience with the complexity 
of transatlantic bureaucracy becomes clear. He explains 
how he urges his fellow administrators in The Hague 
to stop using big words, to stop talking, and to put 
things in motion. This is a plain invitation to act: let us 
get to work, together.
This approach to the metropolitan state is not the 
attitude of a sole and exceptional Saban administrator. 
Harold’s message is widely shared amongst Saba’s poli-
ticians, commissioners and high officials. One politi-
cian, for instance, explained to me that they do not 
wish The Hague to be like ‘a babysitter’ simply watching 
over them. What Saba wants instead is something 
‘more in terms of that you really be there and be active, 
an active role. More in-depth’. Their common strategy 
is to try and comply to the new regulations that consti-
tute ‘good governance’ in order to charm the Nether-
lands into genuine engagement.
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I thus view Harold’s storytelling as an act of resist-
ance, but one that leads his audience into an unexpected 
direction. In both quotes above, Harold manipulates 
(bureaucratic) language by strategically code switching 
between English and Dutch. He smoothly integrates 
Dutch words such as aanbestedingsregels and proverbs 
such as praatjes vullen geen gaatjes into his story – both 
don’t easily roll off the tongue of a non-native speaker. 
The selective use of these words serves to mock metro-
politan efforts at ‘good governance’. Harold thus shows 
that he speaks the words of ‘good governance’ whilst 
playing with their meaning. Proper governance, 
according to Harold, is not solely about adhering to the 
strict rules of technocracy and exemplifying fiscal 
correctness but is about getting to work and getting 
things done. In other words, he resists the notion that 
transatlantic relations of governance should be rooted 
in distrust and focused on control. Rather, these rela-
tions should be characterised by a shared commitment 
to get to work and make progress happen. The re-telling 
of the legend of the dike powerfully conveys the idea 
that the Netherlands might have a view of what consti-
tutes ‘good governance’, but that this is not the only 
way of governing well.
Local people don’t wait for no overleg
The last story that I want to discuss here is set in Saba’s 
harbour. A Saban harbour master named William and 
a Dutch-metropolitan chief of police are its protago-
nists, the harbour master is its narrator. This story 
allows me to go beyond discourse to explore power and 
resistance in a more practical sense. In particular, it 
shows how the main themes discussed above can come 
together in a real-life situation and inform the exercise 
of state power on non-sovereign Saba.
On an otherwise calm day in August 2015, a small 
FedEx plane crashed in the Caribbean Sea just outside 
of Saba’s harbour. From the dock, the plane moved in 
and out of sight as it bobbed on the waves. The plane’s 
unusual flight course had been observed by many on 
the island and rapidly drew a mass of people to the 
harbour. Emergency personnel and other functionaries 
also were present at the scene within ten minutes. A 
sail ship that had dropped anchor nearby quickly 
rescued the pilot and medical professionals helped him 
into an ambulance.
Then, however, things turned ugly. Various 
uniformed civil servants started quarrelling with each 
other. The disagreement between the local harbour 
master and the Dutch chief of police was the most 
heated. It revolved around the small fishing boats 
circling the airplane. They were trying to collect the 
plane’s cargo before it would sink and came back into 
the harbour carrying the pilot’s logbook and some 
packages. The fishing boats were too small to pull the 
entire airplane into the harbour. William and the 
captain of the larger ferry then decided over the radio 
that they would drive the ferry close to the airplane so 
that two swimmers could try to wrap a rope around it, 
so as to prevent it from sinking. All of this infuriated 
the Dutch head of police since protocol prescribed that 
no one but police officers were allowed to touch 
evidence. As they were the ones to conduct an investi-
gation on the crash, the police were to be the authority 
in charge, not the harbour masters.
After much yelling, cursing and walking away – with 
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the plane still in the water, slowly sinking – the 
Governor was able to mediate between the angry 
officers. Amongst them, it was decided that a police 
officer was to be on board of the ferry. Over the radio, 
the captain of the ferry could be heard yelling that they 
were to hurry up. When William passed this message 
on in English to a nearby Dutch police officer, the 
young man replied: ‘Wacht even, ik moet eerst overleggen’ 
(Wait a minute, I first need to consult [my superior 
officer]). Eventually, the ferry drove out too late and 
the airplane sunk before the boat had reached it.
Later in the afternoon, when things had calmed 
down and the harbour master was back in his office, I 
asked him about what happened on the dock. Below is 
his version of events:
I told a fishing boat to go and retrieve the debris 
from the airplane and the officer just started 
screaming at me. ‘They can’t fucking do that! It’s 
evidence!’ He was saying that the police are supposed 
to remove the evidence, but the way he was speaking 
to me… I just said ‘fuck it’ and walked away. Then 
the Governor had to speak to him. He said: ‘You 
know, that’s the harbour master you were speaking 
to’, so he came to offer me an apology. I said I gave 
the fishing boat the authority to pick up the debris. 
I am responsible for that. The debris was just floating 
around in the ocean, it was just gonna cause another 
accident. And you don’t even have a boat; you’d ask 
the same fishermen to pick up the debris. I told him: 
‘I know you [sic] from a big city where things are 
different. Here, when something like this happens, 
friends and enemies come together and help out 
and then continue their normal lives’. I know he was 
trying to follow protocol and everything, you know, 
close off the scene and all. But how you [sic] gonna 
close off an ocean?
The harbour master then continued talking about the 
unsuccessful compromise they had reached, to have a 
police officer aboard the boat that was going to retrieve 
the airplane. He said:
You either work with local people, or you work 
without local people. If you work without them, 
local people themselves will do it. Local people don’t 
wait for no overleg. They try to get things done.
By now, the reader hopefully recognizes some common 
themes in the stories that Sabans tell about Dutch state 
agents. In William’s narrative, we again find accusa-
tions of metropolitan incompetence and the notion 
that local people will simply get things done. Without 
overestimating the effectiveness of this discourse of 
resistance, I would like to draw attention to its practical 
effects.
First, let’s look at the harbour master’s strategic code 
switching between English and Dutch. William’s use 
of the word overleg conjures up connotations of irra-
tional overregulation and inertia. To have an overleg 
means to talk instead of to act. It is all too clear for him 
that such technocratic logics undermine proper govern-
ance. This attitude cannot be interpreted as a categor-
ical rejection of metropolitan state agents. Indeed, even 
William here does not denounce the involvement of 
the police officers in managing the plane crash, but he 
questions the usefulness of their particular actions. On 
many other occasions, and with regards to routine 
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bureaucratic practices, I observed how local residents 
found subtle or more direct ways to educate civil 
servants from overseas about proper and fair ways of 
governing. This involved training civil servants into the 
nuances of executing their jobs while allowing for the 
smooth continuation of regular life. It is clear that 
metropolitan state bureaucracy is not wished away; 
rather, it is expected – or coached – to conform to local 
values and needs. In a statement that echoes Harold’s 
earlier remarks, William explains that to govern well 
on Saba means to ‘try to get things done’.
William also stresses the inappropriateness of 
protocols and consultations by contrasting them with a 
romanticised notion of local sociality: ‘Here… friends 
and enemies come together and help out’. By doing so, 
he not only professes that ‘we can do it better’ but also 
establishes his superiority over the chief of police; he 
says that he commanded the fishermen to salvage the 
debris and explicitly takes responsibility and accounta-
bility for their actions. Moreover, in William’s version 
of events, the police officer humbly offered his apolo-
gies. A week later, when I asked him about the after-
math of the event, William stated that the chief of 
police had apologised again, but this time in a meeting 
in front of all the functionaries involved. It was clear 
that the harbour master experienced this as a personal 
victory over a Dutch-metropolitan officer, or at least 
presented it that way in his reflection on the event. 
Even though the attempt to salvage the plane was 
unsuccessful, the event allowed for a reconfiguration of 
power relations between local and metropolitan civil 
servants.
Beyond revolutions lie ordinary tales of 
autonomy
The old story of postcolonial independence is a seduc-
tive one. It promises oppressed and exploited nations a 
way to take control over their own lives, truly free from 
outside interference. This paradigm of freedom is so 
persuasive that one would almost forget that this is not 
the only way in which formerly colonized people have 
imagined their political futures (Bonilla 2015a). Schol-
arly attention to these alternative postcolonial narra-
tives has grown in recent years (Bonilla 2015a; Guade-
loupe 2009b; Lewis 2013; Oostindie and Klinkers 
2013; Pugh 2017; Veenendaal 2015). Building on this 
tradition, I have explored how people in a non-sover-
eign society speak about their entanglement with a 
metropolitan state. In particular, I have examined the 
stories that Sabans tell about Dutch state agents. I have 
suggested that they offer alternative notions of metro-
politan state power and forms of resistance than are 
common in dominant narratives about the non-sover-
eign Caribbean. These Saban stories encourage a 
rethinking of such concepts as sovereignty, self-deter-
mination and independence that are considered to be 
the pillars of political modernity.
The stories I have presented here speak of an attitude 
of autonomy. This attitude is less ideologically moti-
vated than born out of historical necessity. The story of 
the road that could not be built, for example, alludes to 
the shared knowledge that residents on Saba depend on 
each other for their survival and progress; no one else 
has proven to care about their lives before. This, Sabans 
hoped, would change after ‘10-10-10’, the constitutional 
reorganisation which formally places the island under 
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direct control of the Dutch government. In its after-
math, they have to conclude that their dreams of Dutch 
care and technological advancement have not altogether 
come true. In their stories about infrastructure and 
bureaucracy, Sabans indulge in the myth of Saban supe-
riority, bragging that whatever the Dutch set out to do 
on Saba, they themselves can probably do better. In 
effect, they creatively subvert the dominant discourse of 
metropolitan benevolence. But although convinced that 
they can beat the Dutch at their own game, Sabans are 
not tempted by the romance of independence.
This leads me to the main problem in the dominant 
story in Dutch Caribbean literature, which is that it 
presumes the desirability of political sovereignty. While 
popular support for a political status of fully inde-
pendent nation-state is low on all of the Dutch Carib-
bean islands, scholars still write about non-sovereign 
societies as conflicted about their relationship with the 
metropolitan state (Veenendaal and Oostindie 2018). 
Specifically, it is said that the material benefits of non-
sovereignty are at odds with the ideological or emotional 
wish to govern oneself. With this, scholars imply that 
non-sovereignty still is a stopover status in the postco-
lonial road toward independence. In other words, whilst 
stating that non-sovereign societies are abound in 
today’s world, scholars do assume that the desire for 
statehood is a universal one. When we listen to Maggie, 
however, we hear her proudly proclaim that ‘we can do 
it better’, but she does not say ‘without the Dutch’. In 
Harold’s drama of bureaucratic inertia and complexity, 
he does not imagine a retreat of The Hague. Their 
stories of postcolonial resistance do not evidence a 
struggle against oppression, but one against indiffer-
ence and neglect.
In addition, I have argued that the dominant narra-
tive on ‘good governance’ glosses over other moralities 
of governance in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The 
literature easily steps over the fact that the agenda of 
‘good governance’ is mostly about strengthening Dutch 
hold over local administrations (Scheepmaker 2009) 
and fails to critically examine what these technocratic 
interventions look like in practice. Whenever a local 
politician or administrator expresses discontent over 
these metropolitan interventions, this is interpreted as 
a call for more autonomy. What I have suggested here 
is that, on Saba, these lamentations are instead about 
seeking ways to make transatlantic bureaucracy work 
for Saba. This entails an attempt to make The Hague 
genuinely recognize Saba as equally deserving of 
progress – not simply of supervision.
While calls for more formal autonomy might be 
largely absent on Saba, I have suggested that resistance 
to the words and works of ‘good governance’ does 
establish conditions of self-government. The stories of 
roads, dikes and plane crashes all attribute characteris-
tics of diligence, vitality and perseverance to the Sabans. 
The Dutch appear in these stories as tragic, incompe-
tent figures who make things too complex for their 
own and Saba’s good. By doing so, Sabans not only 
challenge the moral hierarchies of governance in the 
kingdom; these tactics are also important educational 
tools for residents of Saba who attempt to train func-
tionaries from overseas about their notions of proper 
governance. Through storytelling, Sabans are actively 
involved in setting and guarding the parameters of 
legitimate state power. Thus, rather than accepting the 
Dutch government’s definition of deugdelijk bestuur, 
scholars would do well to recognize that non-sovereign 
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governance is shaped by moral frameworks both proxi-
mate and distant.
I do not wish to sound celebratory or triumphant 
about these discourses and acts of resistance. The 
concern of this article is, rather, with recognizing that 
the people of the postcolonial world might tell tales 
and engage in practices aimed at improving their 
(collective) lives in ways that challenge supposed 
universal truths of political modernity. I thus encourage 
an examination of state power and resistance in non-
sovereign contexts that looks beyond grand narratives 
of overthrowing or changing the system. In Yarimar 
Bonilla’s words, if we only attend to ‘the supposedly 
empty horizon of nationalist revolution, we are sure to 
miss the many “unspectacular” transformations that 
abound in the daily re-creations of ordinary life’ (2015a: 
172). An attentiveness to local, quotidian stories of 
autonomy shows us how people in a non-sovereign 
context might be able to subtly bend the hand of state 
bureaucracy.
In conclusion, research into current-day postcolo-
nial politics should start with the recognition that the 
grand, romantic narratives of national emancipation 
have come to an anticlimactic ending. Whilst some 
might still produce the prose of independence, they too 
have to confront the sobering reality of today’s interde-
pendent world. This is true as much for politicians as it 
is for students of (non-)sovereignty. As David Scott 
(2004) has argued, the scholarly work of decolonisation 
spoke to particular problems in a particular historic 
moment. The contemporary postcolonial world does 
not show signs of a radical break from the days of 
Empire, but it does offer us a different ‘problem-space’ 
to engage with (ibid.). The political landscape has 
changed and, with it, so have conditions of possibility 
for political action (Bonilla 2015a). As scholars, we 
have to confront our assumptions of what postcolonial 
resistance looks like and accept that this does not 
necessarily or naturally take the form of a struggle for 
an independent nation-state (Bonilla 2013: 222). This 
means that we have to train our ears to pick up on 
alternative notions of self-determination and entangle-
ment. Then we might discover, together with our inter-
locutors, that the contemporary script of postcolonial 
resistance might have less to do with breaking free 
from colonial chains than with finding ways to work 
together.
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Notes
1 Parts of this article are based on my master’s thesis ‘This don’t 
make no sense’: Encounters with the State on Non-Sovereign Saba 
(2016, unpublished).
2 With the term ‘postcolonial’ I do not refer to a period in time 
after colonialism, but aim to address the continued significance 
of colonialism in contemporary political formations (see 
Mitchell 2002: 7).
3 The status of autonomy for Sint Maarten and Curaçao does 
not translate in more autonomy from the Netherlands but has 
in fact resulted in increased metropolitan oversight on financial 
and governmental issues.
4 Francio Guadeloupe’s ethnography on Saint Martin/Sint 
Maarten, Chanting Down the New Jerusalem (2009a), is an 
exception. My reference to Dutch Caribbean studies here 
excludes studies of Suriname.
5 Since the 1990s, a large body of anthropological scholarship 
has engaged with the concept of sovereignty. Much of this lit-
erature builds on the work of Max Weber (1946 [1921]), 
Michel Foucault (1991), and Giorgio Agamben (1998). Spe-
cific approaches vary, but political anthropologists typically 
examine sovereignty as an emergent form of authority 
grounded in violence (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). Even 
though these works have yielded important insights, it is less 
suitable for the present analysis. This article follows a line of 
work that rethinks the concept of sovereignty and its place in 
North Atlantic political theory from an explicitly postcolonial 
and Caribbean vantage point (see, for example, Trouillot 2003; 
Scott 2004; Bonilla 2015a).
6 Please note that all personal names in this article are pseudo-
nyms.
7 Partly, this has to do with lacking technology and machinery 
on Saba, but this situation is also caused by other factors, such 
as bidding restrictions regarding minimum insurance coverage 
for businesses and hiring practices of international companies 
that bypass Dutch labour regulations.
8 Madurodam is a miniature park in The Hague, the Nether-
lands, and features small replicas of Dutch landmarks. 
9 In my thesis, I explore in more detail how bureaucratic models 
are reconfigured in practice by structural exceptions inherent to 
Saba’s non-sovereign status as well as by local notions of proper 
bureaucratic behaviour.
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